Ukraine -- What now?

 Ukraine -- What now?

I’m reading several news accounts today of how the U.S. is to blame for Russia/Putin’s action with Ukraine.  They say it started with the U.S. attempt to expand NATO when the Soviet Union collapsed.  Oh really?

 

As I recall almost thirty years ago – the mid-1990s – as we were dealing with a newly created Russia and the questioning if NATO was still needed, what shall we do with NATO?  Some of the idealistic talk was that if a new free Russia could liberalize it could join with the rest of Europe economically and a cooperative military arrangement could be made that would work with NATO.

 

This talk was not that all idealistic; it was acted on.  While Russia was not ready to join the European Union (EU) economically, it was invited and did become a participating member of the G-7, making it the G-8 in 1997.  With upgrades to its economy, it could be ready to join the EU.

 

Of the former East Bloc of the Soviet Union, all of those countries started their application to the EU between 1993 and 1996 and got their membership after 2000.  Russia never applied or started an initiative to join the EU. 

 

In 1999 the Czech Republic, Hungary, and Poland became members of NATO – none of them border on Russia proper; Poland borders on Kaliningrad which is part of Russia but separate from the main territory because it is wedged between Poland and Lithuania.  So no NATO nation was on the Russian border when Putin came to power in August 1999 and became President of Russia in May 2000.  The Baltic States and other nations on Russia’s border joined NATO 2004 and after.

 

My point is this:  Russia, in the mid-1990s, had two paths to follow.  It could liberalize and join Western Europe, or it could remain as it has historically, an East European power.  It choose the later, not the former; and when Putin came to power, he doubled down on this.  Putin had an opportunity to truly revolutionize Russia’s outlook for the future; but choose otherwise.  Germany had a similar opportunity after WWII in the 1950s – to take its traditional role of a Central European power, counter-balancing its interests East and West; or turn to the West and join in an alliance.  Konrad Adenauer, the leader of West Germany in 1949, choose a new path for Germany’s future.

 

Russia lost its G-8 membership when it invaded the Crimea in 2014.  History has no subjunctive case.  Here we are.  Now what?